In a matrimonial action, defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Giaccio, J.), dated May 6, 1981, which denied her motion, inter alia, to vacate a judgment of divorce entered, upon her default, on September 10, 1980. Order reversed, with $50 costs and disbursements, and motion is granted only to the extent that the judgment of divorce is vacated, and is otherwise denied. The fact that the defendant has not sufficiently established an adequate excuse for her default does not mandate denial of her motion (Price v Price, 52 A.D.2d 800). "It has repeatedly been held that the general rule in respect to opening defaults in ordinary actions is not to be applied so rigorously in a matrimonial action" (Vanderhorst v Vanderhorst, [84 A.D.2d 799 Page 800282]
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